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Monetary Integration in Historical Perspective 
ABSTRACT 
Recent turmoil. on European currency markets has caused 
doubts about the process of European monetary unif·ication. ·This 
paper sets these developments in Europe within the historical 
context of other incidences of monetary integration. The examples 
documented here include both monetary integration among the 
regions· of emerging nation\states, .such.as Germany, Italy and 
• Japan in the Nineteenth Century and German Economic Monetary and · 
Social Union recently; and monetary unions among. existing nation 
states,· such as'the Nineteenth·Century German·, ·Latin and 
Scandinavian Monetary Unions, and .the.,..contemporary West African 
Monetary Union and European Monetary system. These historical 
experiences, which are.viewed from the standpoint of incentives 
of rational ..agents to participate in a collective action, 
indicate many economic and political economic difficulties to 
create a monetary union. 
I. Introduction 
The recent collapse of several major currencies in the 
European Exchange Rate Mechanism has again highlighted the·• 
difficulties inherent in the process of· monetary integration.• ·The 
once seemingly ·inevitable progression to monetary ,,union envi·saged 
in the Maastricht Treaty has been at least delayed, .. if .not 
completely derailed. 
As some of the dust settles following the turmoil in 
European foreign exchange markets, it is all the more apparent 
that the planned European Monetary Union (EMU) is not unique. 
Rather,.EMU is one more in a succession of currency arrangements 
which have been attempted both within emerging nation states and-~ 
among existing states.,some of these arrangements lasted, and 
brought benefits to their members; others soon broke down. The 
aura of inevitability surrounding EMU, created by widespread 
consensus about its desirability, contributed to a sense of 
disjuncture with past experience. Now that the aura hasbeen 
tarnished, the continuities with previous attempts to forge 
monetary unions are more apparent. 
A fresh historical perspective on different monetary unions 
is therefore relevant to ongoing discussions about the future of 
EMU. This paper is designed to· give a bri·ef sketch of some 
historical experiences of monetary integration. The relevant 
.. histories are viewed within a political economy conceptual 
framework which considers the incentives of rational agents to 
participate in collective action .. 
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;II. conceptual Framework 
The term monetary integration or monetary unification encompasses varying 
degrees of integration. 
·.. (1) In the weakest sense, monetary integration·· implies··the ·····­
linking- of national currencies with fixed parities 
accompanied by a narrowing or vanishing band of 
exchange without common reserves or a common central 
bank. This is what corden (1972) called the pseudo­
exchange rate union. The coordination of economic 
policies, particularly monetary policies, is needed to 
prevent .. disequilibria in the balance of payments. 
(2) · The degree of monetary integration is enhanced by the 
establishment of public confidence in the irrevocable 
nature of the fixed exchange parities, accompanied by 
full convertibility between currencies for capital and 
current account transactions. This confidence normally 
emerges only after a substantial transition period 
during which de facto fixed exchange parities are 
successfully maintained or after some kind of political 
unification. 
(3) However, full monetary integration or unification is 
only realizedwhen a common currency issued by a single 
central bank circulates in .the ;a:reaof the monetary 
union. 
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The·basic benefit from monetary integration is microeconomic 
in nature: users of a common currency economize on information -~ 
costs ,and transaction costs. A member of ..,a monetary union. enj.oys 
the··benefits of increased trade as a result of the reduction··or:0 
even· disappearance of•·uncertainty about fluctuations ·in the· 
·exchange rates among member currencies. This benefit is 
partially delivered·-by pseudo-exchange union but fully.·realized 
only after the emergence of public confidence in the fixity of 
exchange rates. Only after full monetary unification is 
achieved, are the transactions costs arising from currency 
·· '""" "Conversion eliminated, -and the consequent benefits of increased 
trade and tourism enjoyed. 
"These microeconomic benefits are closely associated with the 
·. functions of money as a medium of exchange. Money economizes on 
the information costs required for transactions and allows the 
procurement of a stable bundle of goods at a lower cost than 
·· under· barter. The use,,of a· common currency carries an intrinsic-·,· 
externality as a result of its informational properties. These 
benefits from information spillover are nonrival in consumption; 
enjoyment by one member does not reduce the enjoyment of other 
members. This jointness in consumption is one characteristic of 
a public good. 
A secondary benefit from monetary,integrationis 
macroeconomic. Mundell's theory of-policy assignment indicates 
that the effect of regionally specific real shocks may be 
absorbed by flexible exchange rates. However, recent studies on 
3 
regime choice·show·that country specific"monetary-shocks can be 
better managed under fixed exchange rates or under highly managed 
exchange rates (e.g. Boyer 1978, Fukuda and Hamada 1987). 
Whereas the primary benefits of joining a monetary union-are 
microeconomic, -the costs are ·mainly macroeconomic.· The ·monetary -
.independence of national economies becomes -limited, .particularly, 
when international capital mobility is high and"• when wages··and ·~-,. 
prices are rigid for some reason. Therefore the attainment of 
locally desired levels of unemployment and prices within the 
union may be sacrificed. The floating exchange rate system gives 
national· economies· the-~opportunity to follow a maximin strategy 
in the interplay of monetary policies. ·' By joining .. a monetary 
union,. a country. gives.~-up this· maximin position,.and must adhere. 
to the mutual consensus that results from policy coordination. 
Since countries.differ in their.rates of productivity growth, and 
in their preferences concerning the choice between unemployment 
and inflation, a fixed exchange rate'or a single currency often· 
means that the participating countries or regions will-have to 
sacrifice attainment of their individual policy objectives. 
Another cost that was explicitly recognized in 19th country, 
somewhat neglected later, but recently reemphasized, is the 
J:oregoing. of seigniorage revenues.,, If countries .allowed .,foreign:-..;. 
· coins under a metallic ... system ·to circulate 0-within ·their 'borders"'"· 
as legal tender, they gave-up the coinage-charge-which they,could 
have earned by reminting the foreign coins into their own 
currency. Today, seigniorage is earned through requiring the 
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ho'lding of currency on which no -return--i:s---pai:d, · for-example, 
through required bank reserves. Differences in the degree of 
dependence on seigniorage revenues among potential member 
countries in a currency union mean that the opportunity costs of 
foregoing this revenue are unevenly distributed. Large 
differences have the potential to destabilize.a .union, as_Grilli 
{1989) has argued. Although individual nations may forfeit - - · 
seigniorage on their own currencies as the result of creating a 
unified currency, seigniorage revenue may be earned instead on 
the common-currency in a monetary union. Whether a member would 
on;balance lose from foregoing seigniorage at the national level 
would depend- on the mechanisms stipulated for distribution· of ., -­
common revenues amongst members. 
The benefits and costs of monetary integration thus have 
several characteristics. First, in contrast to benefits_of: 
monetary integration, which are international and have a public-­
good- nature, the sacrif.ices made by joining a monetary union are:· 
mostly national. This contrast between the benefits and costs of 
monetary integration is a crucial element when we .apply the 
calculus of participation to the problem of monetary integration. 
Second, the benefit-cost payoff to participating countries 
.:; ~-. ..r~.': changes.,.over.-.time .....,Initially., .the .c.os.ts . .-~of~.,_sacr,if.ici~ng~ ..:d.omest,i.c..."':~ 
economic objectives and an independent-·monetary poJ:icy are ·large-~­
As capital market integration proceedsrso the financing of 
fiscal deficits becomes easier and hence these adjustment costs 
become smaller. However, the common benefits of monetary 
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integration are enj'oyed only at a later· ·stage~ .. -For· example, the 
saving of the costs of currency conversion occurs only after a­
complete exchange rate union has been attained, and the benefits· 
arising from the stability of exchange rates can be reaped.only -
after confidence-in the fixity of parities has been established. 
Therefore, the. benef.its may be attained. only in the long run, and 
uncertainty. remains whether- .they .will·-actual:ly be rea-li-zed, -
whereas the costs of sacrificing an independent monetary policy 
are incurred with certainty at an early stage. If currency 
markets detect any time inconsistency as a result of an 
unsustainable temporal distribution,,of costs and benefits, ,-they 
· will ·,require a premium to hold a national currency· during the 
progression towards full integration. 
Third, the openness to trade and factor flows of-the economy 
of a monetary union member country has an important influence on 
the magnitude of the benefits and costs which she derives from 
·monetary ·integration. If ··an economy is relatively open; with 
large -import ,and.export flows ·:relative ·to domestic ·transactions, -
the costs of adjusting.,. its output or employment - level for balance 
of payments reasons will be small (McKinnon 1963). The savings 
in currency conversion costs will also be proportionately larger 
-· in a more open economy~ If .theor--economy.:.is _closed., .however, -,these-=.::. 
savings will be ·'less significant, ·while the costs of adjustment 
will be relatively large. Prior integration of the markets for 
goods and services and factors of production among member 
countries may increase the desirability of monetary integration 
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'by ·increasing- average levels of openness·~··•.·, However,- -Feldstein 
{1992) makes the case that monetary-integration is not necessary 
for the benefits of other forms, of. economic integration to~-be. 
enjoyed •.. de. Grauwe et al (1992) have taken issue ..with him ~on 
this. 
In order to understand the actual .process. of. monetary· - _ 
integration, however.,· thei;'mere>consideration of the benefits and:.' 
costs does not suffice. One has to analyze the incentive for 
each participant --- whether a nation or a region within an 
emerging nation --- to join a monetary union (Hamada 1985, Ch. 3) 
"' In other words,·trre .political economy' of creating -a·-monetary. 
union must be studied. 
According to the theory of rational participation (for 
example, Riker and Ordeshook 1973, chapter 3), -an individual 
decision unit decides to participate in a collective action if. 
the expected benefit is larger than the expected cost. The 
rational .. decision for a country contemplating membership in a 
monetary union is~to join if---the benefits from ·participation, 
such ·as the reduction•. in uncertainty, -,are larger than the costs, · 
such as the sacrifice of an independent monetary policy. 
When the benefits of collective action exhibit a public-good 
character,·,however, the amount. of:;,collective,.action may be less...;,~: 
than Pareto optimal. Olson showed this by-applying the theory of 
public goods to collective action ·(Olson 1965; Olson and 
Zeckhauser 1966). Following the Samuelson principles of public 
goods provision, a rational individual decides on the level of 
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'l)Ublic good provision by equating the·marginal private benefit 
from the public good with the marginal cost of supplying a unit 
of the good. Thus, the·supply.of the public .good .may be less than 
.,. optimal because an. individual decis.ion unit does not .take .account 
of the external effect on other decision units. Therefore, even 
when a consensus exists concerning the objective of a collective· 
action, the.amount produced may ,be too small. 
An interesting testable hypothesis about group·behavior 
emerges: that the behavior of a large group will be different 
from that of a small group. The shortfall in supply of a public 
.,, good ,will be· more·· likely·· in·· a larger group because.,·the free-rider 
, •:probl·em wi•ll · be· more· acute if each member·'shares in the common · ""' 
benefit to·only a small degree. A second hypothesis is·that the· 
·;,,;· · :• decision· unit which receives a relatively large proportion· of the 
·benefit of public goods will be more willing,,to bear a larger 
than proportional share of the cost. As a corollary, a smaller 
decision unit may have disproportionate influence since her 
.participation ...af.f.ects the level of benefits enjoyed by the 
larger. A small decision unit may therefore take advantage of a 
large one (Olson 1965). 
Olson's theory of collective action can be supplemented by 
, ,.the· theory of polit,ical entrepreneurship·· or ..leadership s:tudied<:-b¥ 
Wagner (1966) and developed in more deta:11 by Frohlich,· 
Oppenheimer, and Young (1971). If an agent with political 
entrepreneurship can persuade the group of the effectiveness of 
collective action in spite of the apparent excess of individual 
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cost over individual~benef:i:t, then the optimal :amount of 
.co.llective goods may be supplied, with some leadership surplus 
left over for that agent. 
,,These insights from the .political ..economy .literature.. may.,.be:.. 
applied to the decision of a country to participate in a monetary 
union~ This decision ·is based on .. a comparison .of the· gains ,from 
joining a 'union with the costs and :,is an all-or-nothing decision. 
The addition of a new member to a monetary union generates 
externalities for existing members, who may experience the 
benefits listed earlier. However, the potential member decides on 
5.participation based on . individual costs and benefits. ·Hence, ·the 
·, "' ·failure,,of 'individual rational actors to take account of such 
externalities,,may mean that a currency union is iSma1ler than 
,optimal (Casella 1990, ,\•Hamada 1985.). The role of a· nation -which 
serves as monetary...entrepreneur· is to broker compromises among , 
potential participants to overcome the coordination problem. This 
may require offering non-economic incentives (or coercing) or 
subsidizing the .short-run costs of smaller members in order to 
encourage their participation. In the context of monetary unions, 
a 'free rider' is a country which unilaterally fixes its currency 
to that of an existing union in order to enjoy the benefits of 
such.ass.ociation., ·but.without. the. multilateral':commitment to.....:~:;;;. 
exchange fixity which binds monetary union members and may · cause ·· 
them adjustment costs. 
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-.c--I>II. -- Monetary Integration in the Formation-of Nat-ion states 
Historical examples of monetary integration can be found in 
the process of forming new nation states. The experiences of 
p . , such -countries as 19th;.Century--.Germany; Italy and-.Japan, :which,.;;..:,1:-
developed relatively late, are particularly interesting because· 
the process of monetary and·currency unification .in these 
countries meant uniting currencies issued by local.provinces into 
a single national currency {Hamada 1985, Ch.3). The recent German 
Economic Monetary and Social Union provides a modern example of 
this process. Finally, a case of monetary disintegration, as the 
,Austro-Hungar.ian Empire. was broken up, sheds further·light on 
factors important.to integration by illustrating the reverse 
process. 
(1) Germany 
,The creation ,of a;united Germany in 1871 followed a long 
period of gradual economic harmonization. In 1834, the 
Zollverein, a customs union of 18 German states, was created. 
Member states agreed to relax internal customs barriers 
{Henderson 1984). The·collection of customs duties at the borders 
of the Union and their·distribution to member states necessitated 
a stable means of exchange among those with their own currencies . 
.,In. 1838, .the Zollverein .states ..agreed .. .to... f.ix.... the values,.of, ·their:;;_ 
currencies to the Cologne mark of fine silver. Two currencies 
associated with the larger states predominated: the thaler.of 
Prussia was the major currency of northern Germany while the 
florin was used in Bavaria and other southern German states. As 
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, the· ·driving force·• in the move to expand ·the ,zollverein, Prussia 
thus played the role of monetary entrepreneur by promoting 
increasing measures of integration. 
Although the 1838iagreement.helped establish a firmer. 
relationship between the two main currency blocs, there were 
still seven currencies circulating in the German statesat·the 
.time of-unirication .in-'1871. All the pre-unification currencies 
had silver as their basis. Thirty-three banks had the right of 
note issue. The process of monetary unification took place in 
three stages. First, the mark became the new currency unit in 
1871 and the minting.of gold.coins was regulated. The value of 
the ·mark was defined with respect to circulating silver coins ·­
which were to be gradually withdrawn from circulation. This shift 
towards a gold.. ·standard;;;was· consolidated in the second phase of 
·monetary unification in 1873 ·when the use of ·silver as .legal 
tender was restricted to small denomination coins. As the second• 
major nation (after Britain) to adopt the gold standard, Germany 
increased,.the ...momentum of the move towards gold in other 
countries. Third, in 1875, the Prussian Bank became the 
Reichsbank with a charter of serving as state bank for the entire 
new German state. Although the other banks retained their right 
of <issue, these .rights .were gradually. circumscribed, untiL.in""'~.;.'.;_:, 
1935, the last five banks had their ·issuing privileges cancelled. 
German monetary unification was largely complete by the end of 
the third phase, only four years after political unification. 
However, the process had followed years of gradually increasing 
11 
· economic integration. 
(2) Italy 
The unification of Italy in 1861 happened so rapidly and.the. 
· new state was-born in such turmoil that there,hadcbeen,little 
opportunity to give thought to her structures and institutions. 
At the time of unification, there were five different currencies, 
and.five banks of· issue,·which increased to six.when Rome.was 
added as a region in 1870. It was decided to make the Piedmontese 
lira the new national currency, now called the Italian lira. The 
lira became the basic unit in a bi-metallic system in which the 
·· rate of gold-silver conversion was fixed at 15. 5 to 1. Other 
•coins were to be retired and reminted., The various regional banks 
resisted attempts to remove their rights of note issue. In 1893,· 
·1 however, the ·· Bank of Sardinia, which· had· emerged· as the fastest· '· 
growing and largest .bank,·· forma;lly. became the Bank of Italy by · · 
merging with the Tuscan banks. The last two original banks were 
relieved of their right of issue in 1926~ The process of-monetary 
unification took...longer in Italy than Germany, in part due to 
continuing economic problems inherited from pre-unification, and 
in part owing to the lack of a strong, distinct monetary 
entrepreneur. 
(3) Japan 
In.Japan during the.Tokugawa period, the central government. 
monopolized the coin issue, which was based on a bi-metallic 
system of gold and silver with auxiliary use of copper and iron 
coins. The right of note issue was however left to the feudal 
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lords of the provinces, subject to central·government control. 
Often local notes were issued to ease the financial difficulty of 
local lords; sometimes, it was to provide liquidity to offset .the 
deflationary effects·. of the· coinage policies fof · the central 
government. ·At the time of the Meiji ·Restoration, ·1700 kinds of 
notes were in issue in 244 provinces ---.probably the largest 
number of issuing agents ··within. the· borders of a single,,·nation. - . 
·Fol'lowing the Restoration, the government introduced the yen as 
the new currency unit in a decimalized system. Yen coins were 
issued in both gold and silver at a ratio of 1 part gold to 16.11 
parts silver. Although the system was bi-metallic in name, it was 
at first a silver standard in practice (Muhleman 1895). Local 
notes were redeemed by.the central government during 1872-1879, 
and new ,national banks·\given the right of issue. In 1899, ·· _ 
following inflation, .. caused by excessive issue of inconvertible­
notes, and subsequent deflation,· the Bank of Japan became the 
,single bank of issue. Ultimately, Japan too came to adopt the 
gold standard. 
(4) GEMSU 
The most recent example of monetary union following 
political unification is the German Economic Monetary and Social 
Union (GEMSU) _Treaty ~between· West Germany .and...::the German _____ 
Democratic Republic (East.Germany) which came·into.force on 1. 
July 1990. Driven by the political necessity of symbolic unity 
but also by fears of economic instability in the GDR, the treaty 
made provision for a two-tier system of conversion of Ostmarks 
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,,,,·'(OM) into Deutschmark (DM). Salaries and ,wages, pensions, debt 
contracts and personal.savings up to OM 2000 were converted ata 
rate of 1 for 1. This rate·was well in excess both of black 
market exchanges of DM ,for OM prior to union and ·of .measures of."" 
purchasing power parity. Other"balances·were·converted-at the 
rate of 2 OM to 1 DM, resulting in an average conversion rate of 
· :1. 8 to 1 -for alb,exchanges. West Germany•. as the dominantxpartn-er:., 
in the union undertook the role of monetary entrepreneur in 
initiating the union and in underwriting the fiscal consequences. 
Although it is too soon for much scholarly research into the 
economic consequences of this union, Akerlof-,et al (1991) ·provide 
some early assessments. The conversion of labor costs at the 
preferential level hascaused a.cost-price squeeze for eastern 
German firms since they have been unable :to raise ·prices.• · This is·0 
because demand for-their goods has declined dramatically, as 
eastern Germans took advantage of their newly gained purchasing 
, • '" power to obtain western products of higher ....quality.. Fears .of an 
- inflationary...spending boom by .eastern Germans appear to have 
proved groundless since there is evidence that the eastern 
personal savings rate rose following unification. However, a 
large fiscal burden has followed unification as a result ·of the-· 
costs of. harmonizing ··phys·ical .•and ,social infrastructure,··and of.·'-:'.':;" 
selling of'f or closing .bankrupt firms ,,caught· in the cost-price 
squeeze. In the absence of politically unpopular tax increases, 
the German budget deficit has swollen. As a result, the German 
inflation rate has moved above that of other northern European 
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nations for the first time in years. Monetary polh:y has been 
.,left to bear the brunt of the battle .against .inflation, resulting 
-in the high interest rates which caused unsustainable strains on·· 
many EMS partners. 
(5) National Disintegration: Austro-Hungary 
At a time when ·several nations are disintegrating into 
component regions.,, and,,,the- newly 0 'independent ·regions··-are 
considering new currency arrangements, some recent research has 
focussed on the monetary implications of political breakup. This 
is, of course, the converse to the process of monetary union 
formation which we have thus far considered, but it does fit some 
···of the patterns and confirm some of the assertions made here. 
Dornbusch (1992) and Garber and Bruce (1992) chronicle the 
·breakup ·of the. Austro-Hungarian-Empire into the ·separate. nations-~­
, of Austria, Hungary-, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, -. Poland and 
Yugoslavia following World War I. Prior to breakup, the Austrian 
crown, ·issued by-the Austro-Hungar.ian Bank -located in Vienna, 
was the -currency-.of., the Empire. During the War, the Bank had 
increasingly become involved in financing the fiscal deficit of 
the Imperial Government. After the breakup of the Empire, the new 
states continued to use the crown, constituting a de facto 
monetary union. However, the Austrian \government used its .. 
privileged access ·to-the Bank to secure continued inflationary·"•·"' 
financing of its spending. The negative-spillovers from sharing a 
common currency over which they had no control soon became more 
apparent to the other new states as hyperinflation set in. 
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:Attempts to shore Up'the currency union through arlowing formal 
representation of other states on the board.of.the Bank failed •. 
In 1920, Yugoslavia and czechoslovakia·were the first of the new· 
states to require that crown notes circulating in their 
territories be stamped with their own ·· mark in order ·to be "legal· 
tender, thus de facto creating their own currencies and rupturing 
the monetary;union •. The, macro-stabilization ... of these economies;,in 
the wake of hyperinflation required further drastic measures. The 
consequences were particularly severe for the states which were 
slow to leave the crown monetary area. Thus without the 
overarching political system of control and decision making under 
the old ·Empire, there was no framework· for credible coordination.,., 
of. monetary, .policy.; the Austro-Hungarian crown currency area did• 
riot long survive'the •end of ·the Austro-Hungarian Empire. 
IV. Monetary Unions among Nation States 
The incidences of· lasting monetary union among states·which' 
· are not moving ...towards political integration have been relatively 
rare. We wil.l.discuss here three historical examples: the German. 
Monetary Union with Austria, which was short lived, and the Latin 
Monetary Union and the Scandinavian Monetary Union, both of which 
lasted several decades. Then .we will describe two .present day ··""'· 
examples, the West African Monetary Union and,the European 
Monetary System (and the move to European Monetary Union). 
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{l) German Monetary Union 
In 1857, as part of moves to expand the Zollverein, the 
German Monetary Convention was established between Austria-and 
the German states which were Zollverein members.- A new,metric­
measure called the·Zollpfund was,agreed on as the basic currency 
unit, replacing the Cologne mark. Parities were reassigned to the 
'.thaler. and ·florin ..accordingly .. ,Provisions,were.,made for.-the 
minting of new gold coins, called crowns, and silver coins, 
called Union thalers, although these coins did not achieve wide 
circulation. The unionwith Austria did not last long because the 
.Austrian government soon abrogated the agreement and retained its 
··"fluctuating 'paper money. Following the Seven Weeks .War, the 
.Monetary Convention was formally,dissolved in 1·867, although it -
remained in force between the participating ,German states unti·l '-· 
the new arrangements were agreed after political.unification in 
•'1871. Although the union with" Austria was short-lived, it did -
provide·further impetus towards the integration of monetary 
,, -relationships -.between the German states. The break with Austria 
illustrates the problem of joint control and coordination in 
unions where political jurisdiction is divided and where 
interests differ. 
(2) Latin Monetary Union 
The Latin Monetary Union was established~in 1865 between 
several other European·states, not long after the German Monetary 
Convention. Although it lasted considerably longer than the 
German Union, its survival was critically dependent on France as 
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thedominant member. ·The Union was created on the-basis of the 
bimetallic system established in France by Napolean in 1803, 
under which the ratio of exchange of gold to silver was fixed at 
1 to 15.58. Other countries also adopted this system --- Belgium 
(from 1832), Switzerland (1850), Italy (1862).·As a result, 
relatively stable exchanges prevailed between them which "•eased 
the path to union later. 
Following discoveries of gold in the 1850's in California 
and Australia, gold became relatively cheaper, driving silver 
from circulation. This would have.resulted in de·facto adoption 
0of a "gold --standard ·in bi-metallic countries -if they had not 
decided to reduce the fineness of their silver coins. However,· 
since the devaluations·0were uncoordinated, :the- -:established-;. system 
:-of.international exchange rates was-upset. In these 
circumstances, Belgium.proposed to France that they coordinate 
policies regarding metallic fineness of coins and terms of 
monetary issue ~···This proposal culminated in the Latin Monetary 
TJnion.,.Agr_eement ..oL.:1865, whereby France, Belgium, ~Italy and 
Switzerland agreed on the issue of gold and silver coins of 
standard fineness which circulated freely as legal tender in 
member countries. A standard coinage or seigniorage charge was 
announced. Greece joined the union in 1867 .• .A number of other 
states in Europe, such as Spain, Rumania, Serbia, Bulgaria; 
Austria and Finland, and in South 1and Central America, adopted a 
similar coinage system without formally joining the Union •. 
Efforts to involve other leading nations led to the International 
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,, Monetary conference of 1867 in Paris, ,but-the lack-,ef interest in 
Britain and the hostility generated by the Franco-Prussian war 
blocked further extension of the union. 
,The bimetallism.of the Union came.under pressure as new 
supplies of silver discovered in Nevada in 1873 came on the 
market; also, since firstly,· the new Germanstate,· and --then 
Holland (in 1873), opted for.a gold standard, silver flowed from, 
there into the mints of Union members, with a corresponding 
outflow of gold. In 1874, the coinage of the basic 5 franc silver 
piece was limited and in 1878, was suspended altogether, other 
than for token subsidiary coinage. The Union was then described 
as following a 'limping bi-metallic standard', with gold as the 
effective basis 'and silver for incidental use "(-Clough 1952). The·. 
Union treaty was amended to provide that each state would-,redeem'" 
its silver circulating ,.in .. other states in gold ,on termination of. 
the Union. Due to the superior economic power of France, the 
union was asymmetrical~- Large ,numbers of foreign silver -coins 
accumulated.in.the-Bank of France: Willis estimated that in the 
event of termination in 1905, France would.have had to collect 
250 million francs in gold from Belgium, 270 million from ..Italy 
and 14 million from Greece. None of them could have met even 
their reduced obligations under an 1885·treaty revision. Willis .. 
therefore concluded in 1905 that the union was "doomed to 
existence in its present condition for an indefinite period 
(p.267)", despite frequent statements about the desirability of· 
its dissolution. The union effectively broke down at the outbreak 
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! · ··· , of ·world War I when a paper standard was introduced1 but was 
formally dissolved only when Belgium withdrew in 1925. 
(3) Scandinavian Monetary Union 
A monetary union was formed between the neighboring 
Scandinavian countries of Sweden and Denmark in·1873. Norway 
joined this union in 1875. A common currency unit, the krone, 
. which was gold.'based 1 circulated as legaLtender in member 
countries. In Sweden, note issue was in the hands of the Bank of 
Sweden and private banks, while in Norway and Denmark issue was 
restricted to the Bank of Norway and National Bank of Denmark 
respectively. The union was extended to cover note circulation 
·· when in 1894, note issuing banks in Norway and Sweden .agreed to 
accept each ··other's... notes at par. Denmark joined this agreement 
in 1900. From 1905, ·the conditions of circulation of note,dssue_ 
were amended·to·allow for commission to be charged on foreign 
notes. Despite-this added cost~ joint circulation of notes 
continued until'' the outbreak of -World ·· War I; , when redemption of .,, 
bank notes was suspended and the union in-•effect ended (Nielsen 
1933). 
Present Day Unions 
(4) West African Monetary Union 
The longest surviving .present day _,.monetary union is _the _West 
African Monetary Union ··(WAMU) between wseven countries of 
Francophone West Africa. This union was created around the 
Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) in 1962 and has 
continued since then, with a major revision in its operating 
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arrangements in 1974.,WAMU is one region·inthe-wi-der CFA Franc 
zone in francophone Africa, originally established in 1948~ In 
the other region, six central African states have a common 
central bank, the Bank of Central.African States (BEAC) which. 
issues in each a separate currency which is legal tender i-n all 
six. our focus here, however, is on the former region, WAMU, 
which constitutes a more tightly defined monetary .union.. In· WAMU", 
the BCEAO issues a common currency, the CFA ··franc, which is tied 
to the French franc at a rate of 50:1 with the support of the 
French government. This support now takes the form of an 
overdraft ·faci-lity·at the French Treasury with which the bulk of 
foreign,>exchange reserves of the union. are deposited. In return,. 
·.France ;•exercises,,direct influence over the affairs of.,,the-union < 
through· appointees ··on the Board "Of Jthe Bank~ ·She also exercises----­
considerable indirect influence on-individual members through 
concessional assistance and commercial links. 
·within WAMU, the Cote d'Ivoire,.accounting for almost a 
third -of-. total ,GDP,•.· is the dominant state. Monetary policy within 
the Union operates in a fairly decentralized fashion in that 
National Monetary Committees in each member country decide·on the 
issue of currency within the overall credit allocation guidelines 
decided by the BCEAO board. The Bank itself sets rediscount 
ceilings for each· member, reserve ratios ·and -the rediscount rate-. 
Total bank lending to a member government may not exceed twenty -" 
per cent of total revenues from the previous year. The Union has 
come under strain in recent years as a result of the 
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, overvaluation of th·e CFA franc relative to ,other--currencies due 
to its peg to the relatively strong French franc. 
However, without French support in maintaining the 
convertibility of the CFA franc in particular, one of, the ,,main. 
raisons d'etre of the union would be removed. The union is 
notable for low levels of intra-union trade (only 7.5% of total 
international trade is :with union :members)··· and factor market -
integration, hence the external link to larger trade markets is 
all the more important (Robson 1983, Bhatia 1985). Broughton 
(1991) has suggested that WAMU does not meet conventional 
criteria for an optimal currency union. Its survival should be 
understood1rather as a •result of the link to the French franc. 
-Hence, it is:a form.of monetary standard, more than a currency 
union per se,,, in' which'::the external :anchor has brought discipline 
and credibility to the.economic policy regime of member 
countries. 
(5) EMS and EMU 
The development of the European Monetary System since its 
inception in 1979 has offered a striking contemporary example of 
the process of monetary integration. The EMS was founded as a 
"flexible, symmetric version of the Bretton-Woods system" (Keenen 
1992), following long standing plans of monetary union in Europe. 
The Werner Report of 1970 envisaged monetary union by 1980-:, 
although the turbulent environment of the 1970's was not 
conducive to economic harmonization. Harmonization implies the 
process whereby the differences in key national economic 
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indicators such· as the inflation rate; ·interest--rates and levels 
·- of government deficits and accumulated debt gradually narrow. BY·' 
contrast with the Seventies, remarkable harmonization of intent 
at least,, if not always harmonization of actual economic 
conditions, took place in-the Eighties amongst,the 'Original eight 
ERM members. The eight were joined by Spain in 1989, the UK in 
1990, and Portugal in· 1992. ·.· After frequent early adjustments to 
the Exchange Rate Mechanism, therewere no major realignments 
from 1987 until September 1992. This period of quiet contributed 
to the sense of inevitability in the progression towards EMU, but 
proved to be the lull before the storm of suspensions and 
devaluations of .. member currencies in 'September. 
Increasingly., the •:Deutsche Bundesbank has served as the 
monetary anchor of the·,,,--EMS by virtue' of the size of the· German -­
economy and strength of the Deutschmark. This strength was 
jealously guarded by the Bundesbank with its reputation for high 
inflation:aversion. In a decade when anti-inflationary political> 
commi:t;.ment ran hi.gh., the credibility offered to the EMS by 
Germany through the ERM came to be valued by politicians in other 
European countries. Late ERM entrants such as Britain sought 
entry as .a mechanism for disciplining domestic wages and prices. 
By joining the currency system, entering nations signalled an 
anti-inflationary stance to the market.and bought into the 
credibility of the Bundesbank, with benefits in terms of lower 
interest.rates. By claiming that their economic policy options 
were limited through the constraints of EMS membership, 
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··politicians could avoid some of the blame·forhigh-er unemployment 
•sand lower income in uncompetitive industries.which failed .without 
the protection of a depreciating exchange rate. 
• . However, the monetary discipline provided by .the Bundesbank"­
became punitive as Germany suffered the real fiscal shock ..of 
unification. The costs to other countries of enjoying Bundesbank 
credibility soared, as high German real ,interest rates.were 
transmitted throughout the ERM. Members with below full 
employment felt the effects of the squeeze on interest sensitive 
sectors like housing and construction. The growing divergence of 
" · costs and :benefits ;:opened. the door for speculators to start to 
bet that the ERM link was too costly for weaker currencies to 
.sustain~- Despite: regularly reaffirmed commitments to preserve 
these currency links; and despite 'defensive purchases of weaker · 
currencies by central banks, the speculative attacks of September 
1992 succeeded in forcing several devaluations. Despite the 
·stated intention of ·those forced to.suspend to return tothe 
'I,· ,system., ,conf.idence-in the ERM bands was severely undermined. 
v. Insights From Historical Experiences 
These historical experiences provide several insights 
{Hamada 1985). First, political integration usually preceded 
complete monetary integration, while other forms of economic 
integration sometimes preceded and sometimes followed political 
integration. In 18th century Germany, the formation of a customs 
union preceded political integration and necessitated monetary 
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integration. In Italy, however, political integration, 
.,, ,,, .. necessitating a common currency occurred before the free movement 
of goods and factors was achieved. In Japan, free trade had 
already.been. achieved when.,the Meiji .. government completely,.. , 
centralized political power, but the free movement of labor 
occurred only after the Meiji Restoration. The circumstances 
which precipitated the recent German reunification necessitated·· 
both full economic and political unification simultaneously. 
Second, monetary unions across national borders often did 
not last long because the political integration needed to 
·consolidate them did not occur. These unions were· effective, at 
least in the short run, only if political leadership was provided 
by a dominant country., ··if the number of members was.. few, and if 
·there was extensive 'economic integration. ·In the· cases of the .· ·· 
longer lived monetary unions described, France provided the 
leadership of the Latin Monetary Union, and her influence 
undergirds·the current West AfricanMonetary·Union. Swedish 
•,.l,eade1:1ship ,initiated the Scandinavian .. Monetary Union. With only 
three member countries which were closely integrated both 
geographically and culturally, the Scandinavian Union proved 
remarkably stable over time. The disintegration of the Austro­
Hungarian,monetary system after the collapse of.Empire provides a 
graphic illustration of.the difficulties of resolving complex 
issues of monetary coordination without credible means of 
:~,political coordination°to. ensure cost .and benefit .sharing.·· 
Third, the existence of a metal money, or metal monies, was 
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· "helpful in anchoring an exchange rate union~ This·is because the 
... :c;need. for coordination is substantially,.. reduced when there -is 
common commitment to a standard which constrains allowable 
economic policy.options. In unions with a metallic base, ..the 
issue of irredeemable paper money by some members caused severe 
tensions. This was the experience of the Latin Monetary Union 
when>Italy and Greece issued papernotes·not backed 0 by·metal. 
Adherence to the gold standard undoubtedly strengthened the 
Scandinavian Monetary Union. Indeed, the gold standard system 
itself may be seen as a form of giant pseudo-currency union. The 
simplicity·of the rules of the system made it possible for wide 
spread participation with minimum policy·coordination. In more 
>recent times when ·currencies no longer have a metallic base, ..a 
commitment to ·maintatn-a"··--firm''currency ·has-also served•as~•the ··•·''"'' 
basis for ongoing monetary union •. This is the case both in WAMU, 
with its peg to the French franc, and in the EMS, with the de 
facto link to the Deutschmark • 
.. These. f,,indi.ngs-· can also be related to the calculus of 
participation. The benefits of monetary unification can be 
enjoyed only when strong confidence is attained in the fixed 
parities or when a single currency is circulated. Therefore, the 
metallic content of currencies was important in creating 
confidence in the ·exchange rat·e union •. Some effective political 
integration was still necessary to sustain that confidence over 
prolonged periods of time. 
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Fourth, these historical experiences -suggest-·-the difficulty 
of maintaining two kinds of money in circulation at the same 
time. Gresham's Law was always at work: the currency of higher 
quality·was either hoarded or.exported, leading to an:excess of,,, 
the currency of lower quality in the union. This was the 
experience of the Latin Monetary Union, which received inflows of 
silver· following the adoption of ,the gold standard· in, German·· and. 
elsewhere. Moreover, when there were two kinds of money, 
conflicts of interest often arose. In the Latin Monetary Union, 
for example, France had a vested interest in using silver as the 
standard currency while others favored gold.-In Japan during the 
Tokugawa 'Period., conflict over the metallic content of gold and ·--, 
silver coins•,arose, between merchants around Tokyo where gold was,~ 
more popular ·· and --·those ··around,, Osaka where· silver· was ·more ,·popular­
{Oishi 1974). In the ERM, where weaker currencies circulate side­
by-side with stronger ones, the recent devaluations were forced 
··· by runs out of the weaker currencies, forcing their relative 
price to ..fall in.,.aorder for private agents to hold them. 
Fifth, the cost of participation in a monetary union in the 
nineteenth century involved the sacrifice of seigniorage, not the 
cost of policy adjustments. The costs associated with the 
underutilization of resources incurred in order to correct a 
disequilibrium in the balance of payments were hardly perceived 
before the Great Depression · {Guggenheim ·•1·973) • Recent studies ·of 
the EMS have revived interest in the seigniorage issue. Emerson··· 
et al {1992) simulated the effect of EMU on those member 
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·····•·countries ·most dependent on seigniorage, revenue. According to 
.their estimates,,.only two .. (Greece and Portugal). of the four 
countries currently earning more than 1% of their GDP in 
seigniorage would. forfeit more than 1% of GDP, in revenues .under..; 
the envisaged EMU. Consequently, Emerson et al. argue that the 
micro welfare benefits from fixity in exchange .exceed the 
opportunity costs of this nature even for these nations. 
VI. QUO Vadis Europe? 
The momentum behind the move to complete monetary union in 
Europe, which gathered 0 after the Delors Commission report in 
1989,·has now been slowed if not halted. Feldstein (1992) has 
argued that it .is:the implicit influence of Germany over the EMS· 
which contributed "to the pu·sh'for greater ,monetary integration..in­
the form of EMU. ·EMS members came to favor the explicitly· 
'democratized' monetary institutions of a formalized EMU to the, .· 
de facto rule of the Bundesbank. This logic was borne out in 
recent .months., as....Europe paid some of the price of German 
Reunification through the spillovers of restrictive monetary 
policy. The push to a more broadly coordinated monetary policy in 
the form of EMU was not fast enough, however, to prevent the 
destabilization of the ERM. 
The future·of thee-tightly managed three step Maastrichtplan 
for EMU is now in question as a resu'lt both of the shaking·· of the 
ERM and of the apparent political-disillusionment of voters with 
plans for European Union. A case now exists for a two speed 
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implementation of EMU plans. In this scenario,,thecore 
currencies (essentially those which escaped with their bands 
intact in recent months) will move rapidly to unification to 
·prevent further ..possibility of attack, ,while the peripheral 
economies will converge slowly in ,<economic• performance unt,il :the 
time when their exchange rates can credibly be linked. 
One hundred years ago, Europe also enjoyed a relatively higb 
degree of monetary integration. The emergence of the Italian and 
German nation states had significantly reduced the number of 
continental currencies•in circulation. The currency standard of 
the' Latin Monetary-~union, consisting of France, Belgium, Italy, 
· · · "Switzerland,, and ,Greece, was widely followed by non-members. such 
as Spain, Austria"and ..Finland. This brought some measure of 
·certainty to European currency; ·exchanges. In addition, the. 
Scandinavian Currency Union eliminated the need for currency 
exchanges in this.group of northern European nations. The tide 
·towards monetary·integration reached·high watermark in 1867 at 
··, the ,InternationaL.Monetary :Convention. There, France attempted to f 
i 
persuade other nations to join the new Latin system. For 
political and economic reasons, important actors like Britain, 
Germany and the US refused. The burden of maintaining the union 
in subsequent years fell heavily on France. One hundred years 
later, perhaps this ·lesson of history has be·en well learned. 
France has been among those most insistent in securing German .. 
participation in future stages .of EMU, thereby providing a .. 
broader economic base and greater credibility for the process. 
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This historical survey of experiences of,monetary 
.integration has shown the need, in the .absence of an external. 
(metallic} anchor, for credible political arrangements to resolve 
coordination ,;problems brought about by monetary union. Only 
politically· legitimate' institutions, have· ·the ·authority·to·--address· 
the delicate fiscal questions which are raised by monetary 
integration. For example, fiscal redistribution across regions 
may well be necessary to ameliorate the effect of shocks in a 
single currency area. Redistribution through the federal fiscal 
apparatus is an important factor in facilitating adjustment to 
regional ·shocks within the United. States currency area (Sala-i­
Martin·and Sachs 1991}. However, Eichengreen (1992) has pointed 
· out that the prevai.ling .politicaL'winds in ·Europe, favoring 
subsidiarity and decentralization, ·are.inimical to establishing a 
lasting monetary union/ which requires strong centralized 
coordination mechanisms. Even under a two speed scheme for EMU, 
foreign exchange dealers are likely to be suspicious if the 
,,,broader,,,political ,Mand economic coordination questions are not 
explicitly resolved. Traders' suspicions are premised on an 
implicit version of the rational actor framework sketched in this 
paper: despite protestations to the contrary, members of a 
currency union will not continue to participate if the perceived 
costs diverge· from the"'benefits·'for'·too long.· The feasibility ·and 
hence credibility of a future"currency regime·may be judged by 
the appropriateness"of its institutions for resolving spillovers 
which alter the temporal or spatial. distribution of costs and 
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~"' - -' 'benefits among members~ As recent events show, even -small initial 
.-. doubts about c:r:edibility can multiply. at .exponential rates and 
can provoke a currency run which may undermine even the most 
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